Emerging Powers and Climate Politics: Looking back following (COP26)

Emerging Powers and Climate Politics: Looking back following (COP26)

Lucy Godfrey

SSIS Batch 2021-23

30 October 2022

Abstract: One of the most significant challenges facing the international system is climate change. When the UNFCCC was established to facilitate climate action, state participants were divided into two groups: developed and developing countries. As pressure increased for advanced developing countries to take mitigating action, emerging powers asserted their own interests in international fora by forming the BASIC negotiating bloc. This formal alliance was short-lived as their national interests diverged, and it remains challenging to balance domestic development priorities with international pressure. Great Powers, including the USA, also fall short of meeting expectations for climate action commitments. However, there is little formal recourse to ensure accountability, particularly as solidarity among developed and developing nations decreases. There has also been a proliferation of climate politics, although the UNFCCC remains the main legitimate forum. Emerging powers are yet to fully utilise the soft power opportunities afforded by taking on responsibilities as leaders in the international system. Additionally, non-state actors, including civil society and the private sector, are increasingly engaged in climate politics. Many of these themes and issues are recurrent in other areas of international relations and continue to shape the emerging world order and climate politics in the future.

Keywords: climate, emerging powers, UNFCCC, BASIC, COP26

Introduction

It is widely accepted by scholars of international relations, and beyond that, the international system is in a transitional state, moving away from the unipolar hegemony of the United States, established following the end of the Cold War, and disrupting the liberal world order established following World War II. One of the challenges facing this emerging world order is the impact of climate change. The evolving way in which the greater and emerging powers have engaged with each other to meet this challenge is a valuable lens through which to examine the development of multilateralism in this reimagined world order. The international community still needs to meet many key targets and objectives to prevent catastrophic damage, as the history of climate change politics is riddled with many of the same issues encumbering other multilateral fora.

There is a small body of literature covering the role of the emerging powers in climate action discussions, mainly focussing on chronological narratives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014) (Dubash, 2013) (Ciplet, 2015) (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). There are as yet few scholarly works, including discussion of more recent developments, including the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) in November 2021. This article will attempt to cover some of these recent developments and use the climate change negotiations to draw comparisons to the evolution of a new emerging world order.

Emerging Powers and the UNFCCC

When the UNFCCC formally began in Rio in 1992, the UN framework and North-South dynamic was the accepted format for discussions on climate change (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 469). This division was present in other aspects of the international system, as terms such as "First world" and "Third World" remained ubiquitous. In the case of climate change, this division emphasised the importance of equity and responsibility. This was a time immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union when the unipolar hegemony of the US was becoming the accepted norm, if not already considered entrenched. The US was the leading super-power at the head of a group of developed greater powers, who were primarily responsible for contemporary levels of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) due to decades of industrialization in the Global North. Developing countries of the Global South would essentially feel the brunt of climate change but argued that their development should not be discriminately restricted compared to developed nations and that developed countries should be responsible for using their resources to combat climate change when developing countries are not able to do so.

There was a shift in this dynamic around 2009, ahead of COP15 in Copenhagen, when it was becoming evident that this argument was not quite so defensible for advanced developing economies, whose emission levels were rising. Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the new BASIC negotiating bloc, seeking to distance themselves from the least developed countries and protect themselves from demands of legally binding commitments. This alliance was able to bypass other key players, such as the EU, as BASIC heads of state met directly with the US President to finalise the 'Copenhagen compromise' (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014). The Copenhagen COP is widely considered a failure, disappointing expectations for a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol. As such, the BASIC group was viewed by some as the 'villains of Copenhagen' (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 464), with some delegates, particularly those in the G77 with whom BASIC members were previously closely aligned, shocked that the democratic basis of the UN was undermined with a "backroom deal" (Ciplet, 2015, p. 259).

Although the BASIC countries had been present and influential in the UNFCCC process prior to this, this indicates their transition to emerging powers. Christensen and Xing suggest that China was seeking to benefit from the "hegemonic stability" provided by the US without making individual contributions to the "public goods" (Christensen & Xing, 2016). It is possible to extrapolate this to apply to the other BASIC states in this instance. The emerging powers push for representation and equality in other fora, for example, pushing for reform and permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, but are still at this point unwilling to take on the other responsibilities of greater power. This indicates the rise of 'Westphalian tendencies (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 466), which is characteristic of the emerging world order. State sovereignty, which is threatened by participation in the liberal world order, is paramount for developing countries whose domestic development remains a priority.

Interestingly, this alliance was relatively short-lived as each state's national interests diverged. BASIC was present as a negotiating bloc only in Copenhagen and Cancun the following year. Ahead of COP17 in Durban in 2011, the individual statements and positions of the BASIC members emphasised that they should be associated with the G77/China bloc and not as a separate group. Hochstetler and Milkoreit use a constructivist lens to analyse this shift, evoking the link between identity and identity-appropriate behaviour. However, while the BASIC group had initially constructed the shared identity as a group of emerging powers, their shared understanding of appropriate behaviours diverged (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014, p. 226). As host, South Africa was encouraged to show leadership as an emerging power with responsibility and as a 'bridge builder' championing the expectations of vulnerable African countries (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014, p. 233). Regional identity and association trumped the BASIC alliance, echoing the growing trends of regionalism in the emerging world order.

Similarly, as the host of the following COP for the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, Brazil was keen to position itself as an essential player and cooperative champion. Comparatively, India continued to be the loudest champion for principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). Likewise, until the most recent summit, China seems to have continued to play what Wade calls a 'double game,' simultaneously a superpower and a developing country depending on the context (Wade, 2011, p. 372). Even in more recent UNFCCC meetings, despite efforts to demonstrate its power on the global stage, many still see China as a self-professed champion of developing and climate-vulnerable countries (Geall, 2021).

These trends have developed further in recent UNFCCC meetings. Many saw COP26 in November 2021 as an opportunity to 'build back better after the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a challenge for developing economies and emerging powers due to the necessity to stabilise economies swiftly and continue development trajectories. This is evident in the timelines to reach zero greenhouse gas emissions; India announced its goal for 2070 and China by 2060, whereas the US and UK aim for 2050. At the end of the conference, it was China and India who made headlines by pushing for last-minute changes to the Glasgow Compact at COP26, with India's lead negotiator speaking from the floor of the plenary, pushing for a 'phase down' instead of a 'phase-out of unabated coal use. COP President Alok Sharma was tearful during the closing address apologising that the Compact did not go as far as delegates had hoped. These last-minute dramatics have fuelled the Western media's villainization of India and China at the conference, as it did before at previous COP meetings.

However, it is essential to keep this in perspective by examining the position of developed nations, particularly the US, during UNFCCC negotiations. In the early years of negotiations, the US was reluctant to commit to the targets proposed for developed nations, and since then, two US presidents have effectively crippled UNFCCC initiatives otherwise ratified by hundreds of countries; George W. Bush refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement. Moreover, climate financing provided by developed countries is frequently cited as a failure in the UNFCCC processes. There was once again a failure to meet the financial commitments for climate finance agreed upon at earlier COP meetings, and the funding calls by developing states went unmet at COP26 (Hill & Babin, 2021). The US enacts a realist approach to protect its economy and national interest for many of the same reasons that India, China, and other emerging powers are resistant to commit to more climate action at this stage in their development. As a hegemon, the US can act in its own interest and not in a liberal idealist sense of duty to other states. The multilateral mechanisms of the UNFCCC have no formal recourse to hold greater powers accountable.

Implications for a Reimagined World Order

The global shift from unipolar to multipolar, away from the 'old convergence' style of development and towards multiple 'fractals' of development springing up around the world (Sapelli, 2014), means that there is similar fragmentation in liberal multilateralism and climate politics alike. As in other international relations themes, this has resulted in the fragmentation of different stakeholder groups. The G77 no longer represents a holistic negotiating bloc, having developed into different groups including Small Island Developing states and Least Developed Countries, as well as the emerging powers who despite the brief alliance as BASIC are resistant to being seen as a singular group. For some, like Ciplet, this fragmentation of the South identity undermines its solidarity and significance in global politics (Ciplet, 2015). This makes it challenging for developing and emerging powers to bring the developed countries to the table and enforce their commitments.

There has also been a 'proliferation of fora' in addition and supplementary to the UNFCCC, in which climate change has been discussed internationally, resulting in 'messy multilateralism' (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 476). There have been various bilateral agreements, for example, India-EU Clean Energy and Climate Partnership agreed upon in 2016 and the newly announced US-China agreement at COP26. While these new and sometimes informal groups can be an important aspect of foreign policy for emerging powers, it can also result in 'forum shopping' for greater powers to reinforce their influence (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012) or replace their participation in more mainstream mechanisms and institutions. Prime examples are the establishment of the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP) and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF). This is comparable to establishing new and countervailing multilateral development banks, for example, the BRICS' New Development Bank or China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, established due to developing and emerging nations' dissatisfaction with the US-led World Bank.

Despite this trend, it is evident that the emerging powers, and China, in particular, continue to push to ensure that the UNFCCC remains the primary and legitimate forum for climate diplomacy. As Wade argues, China understands that the balance of power has not yet shifted in such a way to support a Chinese hegemonic world order and instead is pushing for influence in multilateral fora (Wade, 2011), such as the United Nations and the UNFCCC process. This multilateralism creates more space for middle powers, hence the sway that India and China both have in COP negotiations. However, while emerging powers are beginning to utilize soft power opportunities, they are yet to take full responsibility to reap the full benefits.

Non-State Actors

Alongside the traditional state actors discussed so far, it is also worth noting that recent years have also seen an increased engagement with a range of domestic and international non-state actors in climate action and politics. Civil society organizations have a growing public interest platform, most notably the Friday for Futures movement spearheaded by Greta Thunberg. The size of protests and media coverage of the COP meetings seems to be growing year after year. This indicates the increasing pertinence of the negative impacts of climate change as the general public becomes more aware of the growing body of evidence and witnessing increasingly catastrophic natural disasters. For example, for many in the West, the evidence that recent flooding in Germany and Tennessee, USA, was intensified by climate change brought the issue home (Dewan, 2021). Characteristic of globalization and the new emerging world order it is through social media, the digitization of news, and the proliferation of information sources that have enabled this increased engagement with the public.

Additionally, COP26 saw an increased number of commitments and calls from the private sector to reach net zero emissions, including the launch of the Net Zero Financial Service Providers Alliance and an open letter from the Investor Agenda, a group of 587 investment firms representing approximately 40% of global assets (Jackson, 2021). This is interesting in the context of continued globalization and the increasing influence of transnational corporations in the international system. Climate politics is no longer only the purview and responsibility of states and governments but must also be addressed by the transnational corporations which operate across state borders. Hurrell and Sengupta highlight the complexities of this issue in climate politics, emphasizing the global shift from an 'old core' of Western capitalist states to a 'deterritorialized' global, transnational capitalist order (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). Whereas some multinational corporations are calling for more climate action, historically, activists have laid the blame at the feet of corporate and fossil fuel lobbyists for failures in ensuring decreased emissions through climate politics. COP26 seemed no different, with analysis indicating 503 accredited attendees had links to fossil fuel lobbying, outnumbering the total of the delegations from eight countries worst affected by climate change in the past 20 years (McGrath, 2021).

Conversely, corporations, including fossil fuel giants like BP and Shell, have made repeated attempts in recent years to "greenwash" their public relations and CSR activities in response to criticism, demonstrating the impact of public opinion. This complex and, at times, contradictory engagement between governments, the public, and transnational corporations is a hallmark of the emerging world order. It will likely only become more complicated as the challenge around climate change increases.

Conclusion

The shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order is evident in the development of climate change politics, as the negotiating blocs evolved from developed and developing to increasingly fragmented groups. Emerging powers of the former BASIC group utilize their transitional status to shift allegiances according to their national interest. However, the Westphalian tendencies developing in the emerging world order mean the solidarity needed to hold greater powers to account needs to be improved, even in multilateral forums. However, despite the shifting balance of power as the US hegemony declines and the emerging powers rise, it is unlikely to end liberal multilateralism through displacement by an alternative hegemonic order. Instead, emerging powers like China perpetuate multilateral forums like the UNFCCC. These existing structures will likely be supplemented by bilateral agreements and additional processes that evolve as complex climate negotiations continue. This supports theories of 'world re-order,' where new powers are accommodated into existing structures due to the necessities of interdependence and the individual state's best interests (as cited in Christensen & Xing, 2016). Additionally, emerging powers are beginning to utilize the soft power opportunities that climate action affords them, mainly when held in comparison to great powers like the US. Emerging powers, particularly China, continue to grapple with an evolving identity as they balance domestic development priorities with the responsibilities of becoming a greater power.

Looking years and perhaps decades ahead, as the frequency of catastrophic climate disasters inevitably increases along with public and private interest in climate issues, climate politics are likely to become increasingly fraught and pertinent. Negotiations are likely to become increasingly less focussed on mitigation and the management of adaptation and recompense for loss and damage evident in the calls for action LDCs made at COP26. The pressure on emerging powers to make and follow through with significant binding commitments is likely to increase, but this should be balanced with the pressure on existing greater powers to meet their equitable climate commitments.

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