India’s Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: The Centrality of the Mozambique Channel in the WIOR

India’s Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: The Centrality of the Mozambique Channel in the WIOR

Ananya Singh
20 February 2024
IRGA Jan-Feb 2024 Issue
Winner of the SSIS All India Students' Research Conclave 2023

Image Credits: https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/mozambique-channel-facts/

The emerging focus on the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical arena is long delayed, especially considering its significance throughout history. It unites the crucial maritime trade regions of the Indian and Pacific oceans, along with the nations that border it. Defining the region has always been a controversial matter, but India views the Indo-Pacific to be the geography spanning the African Indian Ocean coastline to the American Pacific coastline, being referred to as the stretch from Kilimanjaro to California (Jaishankar, 2022). Stability in this region is essential to maintaining the global economy since it ensures access to critical resources, crucial trade routes, one-third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments. The nations that surround it include West Asian countries serving as the energy providers of the world, resource-rich African Nations and South Asia’s critical labour populace. Despite the importance of viewing the Indo-Pacific as a continuous interlinked maritime section, the traditional Indian political outlook has divisions for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This includes the eastern and western Indian Ocean, and separately the Pacific Ocean (Baruah, 2021).

 

Why the Western Indian Ocean?

 

Indian foreign policy has significantly prioritised engagements within the Eastern Indian Ocean, considering the recent defence deals with the Philippines and Vietnam (Hassan & Maizland, 2016). This has overshadowed engagements in the western Indian Ocean since the focus has been on countering extensive Chinese influence in the South China Sea (SCS). It has become a domain for regional power competition. However, there must be recognition of the fact that there already exists numerous trade partnerships in the region that India is excluded from. This includes the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and BRI  (Belt and Road Initiative) involvements from China (Bhatia, 2023). More importantly, involvement in this region is a constant balancing act on a fine line to not invoke aggression from China. India’s historic Act East policy has remained neutral to SCS disputes, at least prior to 2020 (Saha, 2021). There is a strong threat perception from China in case of any involvement in its maritime proximity. In contrast, the Western Indian Ocean Region (WIOR) is a critical component of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy and is much less competitive. Increased emphasis on this region is crucial to India solidifying its role as a dominant regional actor. It provides India with a more feasible playground in which to counter Chinese influence. There are no personal territorial disputes to fight over; no web of institutions that exclude India; no solitary hegemonic Chinese presence; and arguably, better existing bilateral partnerships in the region. This is not to say that China does not possess an expanding presence in Africa and the WIOR, but it does not threaten conflict the way the situation in the East does. 

 

India & Africa’s Maritime Co-operation

 

India has demonstrated an interest in becoming a provider of security and public goods in the IOR. This is demonstrated through its involvement in the  Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Imbibing this spirit, its maritime policy is referred to as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) (Singh, 2021). At the same time, there is a growing awareness among African nations of the need to secure their maritime fortress and have control over their abundant resources for their national development. Hence, creating a convergence of interests for both parties. A World Wide Fund (WWF) report from 2017 has reported the natural endowment of the WIOR to be over  US$ 333.8 billion and this has only grown since recent discoveries of large untapped quantities of natural gas and coal reserves in Mozambique (World Wide Fund For Nature, 2017). The WIOR is also an intensely strategic arena with numerous maritime chokepoints such as the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Straits of Hormuz, the Mozambique Channel, the Cape of Good Hope and the Suez Canal (Gurjar & Dutta, 2021, 2-17). Unlike other African partnerships that have often resulted in exploitation, India has interests in the region that can co-exist with African interests. The possibility of cooperation has been demonstrated in the ongoing India-Africa forum summits; the 2015 Delhi Declaration acknowledging India’s collaboration with Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy; the 2020  India-Africa Defence Ministers Conclave (IADMC) signed by 50 African countries; and India’s 2021 proposition to continue the India-Africa Defence Dialogue during a series of DefExpos every two years (Bhatia, 2023). African nations have also been marginalised in terms of being involved in an Indo-Pacific strategy and India could address this by building truly equal arrangements addressing African concerns as well. Additionally, in order to have instrumental partnerships with these nations, India must prove its maritime power by attaining naval control over choke points that provide for a fortified security presence in the Indian Ocean.

 

Strategic Importance of the Mozambique Channel

 

Among the five chokepoints, the southern Mozambique channel is a key overlooked trade channel that has rapidly gained importance since a recent discovery of 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas in its Rovuma basin and huge coal reserves that India has a stake in as well (Al Jazeera, 2013). Supplemented by the awareness of its importance during the recent Suez Canal closure due to the grounding of the Ever Given ship leading to maritime trade disruptions that required the diversion of most traffic via the Mozambique channel (Decis, 2021).  It is a component of India’s WIOR strategy in the Indo-Pacific. India considers the Mozambique Channel as a key maritime choke point and its 2015 Maritime Security Strategy identified the channel as one of India’s primary areas of maritime interest (Indian Navy- Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, 2015). A few key African actors in the channel’s immediate proximity are Mozambique, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and French Islands as well as Tanzania, South Africa, Kenya, and Somalia at the periphery.

 

Mozambique is of great strategic importance as it has one of the longest and most crucial coastlines in Africa and lacks the technical capacity required to safeguard it. India has the opportunity to provide this and the incentive for cooperation is that both nations share concerns regarding safeguarding the security of sea lanes of communication(SLOCs) in the IOR.  Both nations are part of the IORA and the IONS for this very reason (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). They have had bilateral partnerships in the past with India providing security on multiple occasions. This includes the 2003 African Union Summit, the 2004 World Economic Forum Summit, the 2006 Defence Cooperation MoU, the 2010 Navy rescue of a Mozambican shipping vessel from pirates, the 2019 Joint Defence Working Group, defence gifts of 2 Fast Interceptor Boats (FIBs) and 44 Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and a  four-member team of Indian Coast Guard etc (Beri, 2014). The defence partnership with Mozambique has been one of India’s most successful ones. However, it still needs to dedicate further attention as many of the plans of the defence MoU haven’t made much progress, specifically, in the area of transferring technology as well as the potential to expand on supplying military equipment, training, maritime patrolling, and collaboration against terrorism and piracy attacks Mozambique faces. India stands to gain as much as Mozambique does if it extends this support. India lacks the energy production to support its large populace and Mozambique has just located untapped gas reserves (“Energy in India Today – India Energy Outlook 2021,” 2021). Lack of initiative would result in the resource slipping away to regional competitors like China, South Korea, South African nations and the West.

 

Additionally, there is a threat to the channel’s stability from rising terrorism and piracy attacks in the region. Extremist activity in the region is a growing concern for both nations and by extension the international community (Decis, 2021). An Islamist insurrection in the region has caused disruption to the Mozambique channel as it often includes a strategy of capturing ports like Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021, resulting in a crippled gas industry. The terror group responsible, Ansar al-Sunna (alternatively known as Al-Shabaab), not only pose a threat to any energy projects in the region but also to safe SLOCs and trade passing through the channel. This is where  India has the opportunity to act as the regional security provider it wishes to be seen as. It must use its R&AW Intelligence capacities to track stolen resources and counter the attacks, as it has done to address domestic terrorism (Beri, 2014).

 

Role of Island Nations

 

The insurgents extend beyond Mozambique as they use the tactic of ‘island hopping’ after stealing vessels from Mozambique.  India has shown interest in the cause of combating terror in its backyard in terms of Somali piracy in the past (Parmar, 2015). Key island nations that are in strategic proximity around the channel facing insecurity include Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and the French Reunion Island. Beyond recent terror attacks, island states in general are crucial to any nation’s attainment of great-power status. This is due to their geopolitically strategic location; role as hosts of military bases that result in power projection; access to maritime resources; the possibility of economic cooperation that any island looks for due to their lack of resources etc. The islands are of strategic importance to India in the WIOR as they serve as a forum for establishing a naval presence in the region along key SLOCs that can provide security to the Mozambique channel (Das, 2019, 42-59). This includes ensuring freedom of navigation in international waters, securing trade through international shipping lanes (ISLs), patrolling maritime territory to ensure the inability of terrorists to consolidate power etc. In lieu of these interests, India has conducted military operations like 2020 joint naval patrols with the French along the Reunion islands, constructing a military facility in Mauritius’ remote Agalega island (INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 2023). India has taken numerous steps to expand its naval presence in Mauritius and Seychelles. It periodically patrols Mauritius’ and Seychelles’ EEZs; aids in building critical infrastructure such as the Hydrographic Unit and coastal radar surveillance systems; provides line of credits for the purchase of equipment to combat security threats; MoUs on renewable energy, ocean economy, agriculture, transport facilities etc; commissions vessels and aircrafts; acts as the maritime security advisor to Seychelles; aids the development on Agalega and Assumption islands etc. Mauritius does not even require a military at all due to the security India provides.  Another important island is Comoros where India lacks engagement to a relatively higher degree in comparison to China. India has signed an MoU on defence; announced a Line-of-credit of USD 41.6 mn for setting up an 18MW power plant;  USD 1 mn for transport vehicles; USD 2 mn for interceptor boats; and had one meeting with the Indian Vice President calling for an interlinked regional maritime security domain between the two nations. Comoros has extended an attempt to build a stronger partnership, requesting that India aid in repairing a patrol vessel (Indian Vice President's Secretariat, 2019). However, China has sent aid and renovated infrastructure while erasing any debt owed. India needs to step up its ties and ensure influence over all parties in the Mozambique channel, with Comoros being the only one largely left out and increasingly swayed into the Chinese orbit of influence.

 

India’s Future Engagement in the WIOR

 

Despite the positive engagements, India still lacks the logistical support required in the region for any effective mission deployment. It must work on building this through the islands it is working on. Furthermore, it must involve WIO nations in initiatives such as the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation and follow through on serious negotiations with island nation partners and incorporate them into a broader Indo-Pacific strategy (IDSA, 2021).  Apart from building its existing relations with Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles, it must be proactive in its effort to bring in Comoros as a reliable ally. Additionally, China is increasing investment, and by extension, its influence in the WIO. However, Indian policy must not be reactionary. It must take a different approach than it had in the East Indian Ocean and continue its own strategic engagement based on what it uniquely brings to the table. India must focus on its competencies in areas like ICT, human resource development, counter-terrorism training, healthcare, agriculture, capacity building, etc in the WIO, rather than playing a risky game of financial deals with an economic heavyweight such as China in the EIO. Furthermore, It must ensure that the Mozambique channel doesn’t turn into the next security dilemma, and prevent the collateral insecurity that would be caused in the IOR for its own interests. It also must create dedicated institutionalised mechanisms to enhance cooperation with targeted WIOR nations as well as build on specialised training exercises, defence cooperation between militaries, peacekeeping operations, technical assistance, defence equipment and infrastructure etc.

 

India should recognise the notorious relationship between a country’s maritime ambitions and influence over island states vis-a-vis its status as a great power. As a result, expanding its influence in the Western Indian Ocean Arena, and specifically, securing the Mozambique channel has to be a critical aspect in its Indo-Pacific policy.

 

References

 

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